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IN THE SUP1:ETl1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UT/1H,

Plaintiff- Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15560

ARVIL ll. HARRIS,
Defen cl ant-A pp ell ant.

BRIEF OF

J~PPELLANT

Appeal from sentence and order denying appellant's
motion for order allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and
enter plea of not guilty; motion to arrest judgment; motion for new
trial; motion to reconsider sentence and for hearing in which to
present evidence in mitigation; motion to review presentence report, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Third District Court Judge
presiding.

ROBERT L. LORD
118 Metropolitan Law Building
431 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
ROBERT B. HJ\NSEN
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent
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IN THE SUPHEIVlE COUHT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTJ\ll,
Plain tiff-He sponden t,
vs.

Case No. 15560

ARVIL A. HAHRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATUHE OF THE CASE
In its

simplest form, defendant seeks an order from

this court allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a
plea of not guilty.

In the alternative, defendant seeks an order vacat-

ing the sentence imposed by the Salt Lake County Court, remanding
to the district court for resentencing with instructions to allow him
to present evidence in mitigation and to review the presentence report.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant was arraigned before the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County and entered a plea of guilty to attempting
to receive stolen property, a class A misdemeanor.

Defendant requested

a presentence investigation which request was referred by the court.

There-

after, and after the court had received and reviewed the presentence report,
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appellant came before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor for sentencing.
He was sentenced to the maximum allowed by law, i.e., $1, 000. 00
fine and one year in the Salt LaJ:e County Jail, and committed forthwith.
Defendant thereafter duly filed a motion seeking an order
allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a not guilty plea;
asking that the judgment be arrested, the sentence suspended, and the
defendant discharged; requesting a new trial; and seeking to examine
and review the presentcnce report and to have an opportunity to explain
or rebut the derrogatory allegations which he believed were contained
therein.

All motions were denied by the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON .l°\PPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this court allowing him to wifr.-

draw his guilty plea, substitute a not guilty plea, and proceed to trial.
In the alternative, he seeks an order vacz.ting the sentence imposed by

Judge G. Hal Taylor and remanding to the district court for resentencing
with instructions to allow defendant to present evidence in imtigation and
to examine and review the presentence report.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was originally charged with receiving stolen
property, a third degree felony.

After the complaint was amended

to charge attempting to receive stolen property, defendant wuivecJ preliminary
hearing in the Salt Lake City Court and was bound over to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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District Court for trial.

To the charge contained in the information

(R. 8, 0), defendant pleaded guilty dlld asked for a presentence investi-

gation 311d report.

(R. 48-52).

Approximately four weeks later, he

appeared before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor for sentencing.

(R. 41-45).

The Court thereupon sentenced defendant to the maximum allowed by law
and committed him immediately to the Salt Lake County jail.

Defendant,

within 10 days filed a motion for a new trial (R. 15-20), together with
supporting affidavits (R. 21-26), which motion was consolidated with
various other motions, the most important of which were his motions to
withdraw his guilty plea, and his motion to see the presentence report and
to be allowed to explain or rebut the allegations contained therein.
20).

These motions were denied (R. 27).

(R. 15 -

Appellant thereafter filed his

notice of appeal (R. 28, 29), designated the record (R. 21, 29, 40), and
otherwise perfected his appeal.
Defendant maintains that his guilty plea was entered upon
the expectation that he would be treated as other first offenders involving
only offense against property, and that had he been so treated, he would
have received only a fine and jail sentence with the jail sentence suspended
and he would have been placed on probation.

(R. 17, 18).

Based upon

the remarks of Judge Taylor at the time of sentencing (R. 44, lines 2
through 12), and other remarks made off the record to defendant's counsel,
defendant contends that the presentence report contained derrogatory inforSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mation to the effect that he was continuously involved in the fencing
business and that he had made threats to do bodily harm to the state

1

0

wi:.ness, and he should be allowed access to the information conhincd
in the presentence report and given an opportunity to explain or rebut

such allegations.

(See Motion for New Trial, etc., R. 15-20, and

particularly the affidavit in support thereof, R. 24-26.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED \VHEN IT l~CCEPTED DEFEND1\N'S
PLEA OF GUILTY \VITHOUT MAKING A DETER!\HNATION THAT
THERE WERE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO \V _A.RRANT A FINDING OF
GUILTY
The trial court adequately det".:"!rmined that the defendant
was entering a voluntary plea and that he understood the consequences.
It uiierly failed, however, to determine if there were facts sufficient

to warrant the acceptance of a guilty plea as required by the principles
enunciated in the case of State vs. Forsythe (Utah, 1977), 560 P. 2d. 337

(R. 48-52).

In the Forsythe case the defendant had been charged with

numerous counts of theft by deception.

Pursuant to a plea bargain he

pleaded guilty to one charge and all the rest were dismissed upon motion
of the prosecutor.

Before accepting the plea, however, the Court heard

a summary from the prosecutor and from tch defense counsel of their
evidence and their respective positions, and based upon such summaries,
accepted the plea.

Apparently a prescnience report was requested, altholl,'
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January 30, HJ7G, and appeared for sentencing on February 27, 1976).
At the time of sentencing Forsythe moved to withdraw his plea of guilty
and to enter a plea of not guilty.

Whether this motion came before or

after the court had pronounced sentence is unclear.

In any event the

sentencing court refused to allow the withdrawl of the plea.
Defendant thereupon appealed to this court asserting two
grounds for relief, i. c. , (a) that his plea had not been freely given,
and the (b) the trial court did not sufficiently ascertain whether there
was sufficient factual basis to justify accepting his guilty plc a.

Justice

Crockett, speaking for the court at page 339 of the Pacific Reporter
made the following observation:
'\Ve recognize, of course, that it is the duty of the
trial court to see that the interests of justice are served
by not allowing a person to enter a plea of guilty to a crime
he has not committed. In performing that duty, the court
is not bound to any rigidity of rule or procedure, but may
do it in any manner consistent with reason and fairness
which he thinks will best accomplish that purpose. This
responsibility was properlv t:1ken care of here by theco;rt
ficanng a :oumman' by the prosecutor and by the defendant's
counsel of thL'tr cnclcncc as to the positi.on of each, upon the
basis of \':lHch the court accepted the plea of guilty on the one
count and grantc:cl the motion to dismiss to the others. (Emphasis
added)
Unlike the Forsythe case, the trial court in the instant case
made no inquiry into any factual matt2rs constituting the alleged offense,
either at the time of arraignment (R. 48-52), or at the time of sentencing.
(R. 41-45).

In fact, the allegations contained on pages 2 and 3 of the
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defendant's motion for new trial (R. 16, 17) raise the presumption
that there was a legitimate defense and hence no factual basis for
accepting the guilty plea.

Because there arc no facts at all upon

which to sustain a determination of guilty established in the record,
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter
a not guilty plea as requested in his motion for new trial (R. 15,
paragraph numbered 1).
POINT II
RELIANCE UPON THE PRESENTENCE REPORT AND
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EVEN ITS SUBSTANCE TO DEFENDANT
CONSTITUTES REVERSABLE ERROR
I

With ever increasing frequency the sanctity of the secret
presentence report is being challenged by defendants at all levels of
the state and federal systems.

Traditionally the courts have held

that the sentencing judge was allowed wide discretion as to the information and the source thereof to be considered by him at the time of
sentencing.

In addition, he was not ordinarily required to reveal to

the defendant the information contained in any prcscntencc investigation
commissioned by the court.

Even so, such discretion was not without

limits, and had to meet certain due process requirements.

Sec, for

example, United States vs. Espinoza (5th Cir. 1973), 481 F. 2d. 553,
where the court held that "Despite broad discretion left to the trial
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judge in assessing background information for sentencing purposes
a defendant retains the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invO.:id premises. "
At the time of sentencing, the judge in the Espinoza case
explicitly stated that he had information that Espinoza had been involved
in various threats and assaults.

Espinoza asked for an evidentiary

hearing, or at least an opportunity to rebut the allegations which he
contended were factually erroneous.

The trial judge refused.

On

appeal the court reversed and sent the case hack for resentencing
with instructions to allow defendant an opportunity to explain or rebut
the allegations.

Quoting from a 1965 United States Supreme Court case,

Harris vs. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S. Ct. 352, 15 L. Ed. 2d. 240,
the court said:
"Fair administration of justice demands that the sentencing
judge will not act on surmise, misinformation and suspicion,
but will impose sentence with insight and understanding. "
See also Townsend vs. Burke (1948), 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct.
1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690; United States vs. Battaglia (5th Cir. 1972), 478 F. 2d.
854; United States vs. Weston (9th Cir. 1971), 448 F.2d .. 626; and United
States vs. Malcolm (2nd Cir. 1970), 432 F. 2d. 809, all standing for the
proposition that the trial judges discretion is not unlimited, that it must
appear that he actually exercised his discretion intelligently and not
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arbitrarily, and that where there is any dispute concerning the accurac·
of the pre sentence report, defendant must be given an opportunity to
re hut.
Although defendant's counsel has developed information whic1,
leads him to believe that the presentence report contains allegations that ~
defendant conspired to do bodily harm to the state's witness, defendant
Harris does not have any certain knowledge that the presentence report
was infected with inaccuracies, or even that it contained any derrogatory
information.

However, as is stated in his motion for new trial (R. 15-20

at pages 17 and 18), considering the disposition of othe:c first offender
cases, he had every reason to believe he would be given probation.

The

sentence is clearly unusual and out of line with that usually meted out

to first offenders involving crimes against property only.

Defendant

moved the court for an opportunity to submit evidence in mitigation of
the offense, and for an opportunity to examine the presentence report
(R. 15, 16), which motions were denied by the court.

Although it was

not reported by the reporter, this writer, as counsel for the defendant,
asked the court at the time of sentencing for some facts in justification
of the sentence, but the judge refused,
The present state of the record makes it clear that defendant
should be afforded an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of the
offense, and particularly should be made aware of at least the substance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the dcrrogatory information in the prcscntcncc report and given an
opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal.

Even more compelling than

any of the above, however, is the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the recent case of Gardner vs. Florida (March, 1977), 97 S. Ct.
, 51 L. Ed. 2d. 393.

In that case Gardner was convicted of first

degree murder in a Florida court.

After the required separate sentencing

hearing, the jury recomendcd a life sentence on the ground that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances.

But the

trial judge, relying in part on a presentence report that he had ordered,
portions of which were not disclosed to or requested by counsel for either
party, imposed the death sentence on the ground that aggravating cireumstances justified it and that there were no mitigating circumstances.

Upon

writ of certiorari the United States Supreme Court vacated the death sentence
and

remand~J

to the Florida Supreme Court with directions to order further

sentencing procce dings at the trial level.
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the court and
expressed the view tho.t (1) the sentencing process, as well as the trial
itself, must satisfy requirements of due process; (2) sentencing was a
critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which the defendant was entitled
to the effective assistance of counsel; (3) the defendant in the case was
denied due process when the death penalty was imposed, in part, on the
basis of confidential information which wo.s not disclosed to the defendant
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or his counsel, and which the defendant thus had no opportunity to dc:ny
or explain; (4) such procedure could not be justified as (a) being esscnti:l

!

to enable investigators to obtain scnsi ti ve disclo surcs from pc rsons unwilling to comment publicly about a defendant's background or character,
(b) preventing delays which would result if full disclosure of the prcsenttr I

report were required, (c) preventing disruption of the rehabilitation precess, or (d) being warranted by the trust to be put in 1 rial judges to exerc.
their sentencing discretion in a responsible manner; (5) even if it were
permissible to withhold a portion of the report from the defendant or
his counsel, it would nevertheless be necessary to include the full repon
in the record on appeal in order that the reviewing court could fulfill its
duty of determining that sentencing procedures were administered with
an even hand; (6) the failure of defense counsel to request access to the
full report did not justify the submission of only a partial record to the
reviewing court or constitute an effective waiver of the constitutional
error in the record, and (7) thus the procedure employed by the Florida
courts did not satisfy the constitutional command that no person shall he
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
It is important to note that there was nothing in the record

of the Gardner case to indicate that there was any thing derrogatory in
the presentcncc report, and that the defendant's counsel did not ask to
see the report prior to the sentencing.

Even so, the Supreme Court J1,i,
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_......I

that due process required that the defcnd;:int be given

8Il

opportunity to

explain or rc;but ::ind that he could not do so unless the presentence report
were revealed to him.

At the very least, it must be included in the record

on appeal.
11

And then there is the statute law of the State of Utah itself.
Section 77-35-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that where discretion
is allowed the sentencing judge, he may take into account any aggravating
or mitigating circumstances which may be presented by either party.
Section 77-35-13 provides in relevant part as follows:
"The circumstances must be presented by the testimony
of witnesses examined in open court . . . No affidavit or
testimony, or representation of any kind, verbal or written,
shall be offered to or received by the court or a judge thereof
in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment except as provided in this section. " (Emphasis added)
The Utah court has not faced head on the constitutional
questions involved in withholding information abtained in a presentence
report, nor has it squarely faced the clear meaning of the foregoing
statutory provision.

In the case of State vs. Martin (1917), 164 P. 500,

the sentencing judge had apparently prsided over another trial involving
the same dcfcnd;:int.

Based upon the knowledge which he had acquired at

the previous trial, as well
imposed

::i

8S

information from the current trial, the judge

rather severe sentence.

Defen<l;:int contended that consideration

of information obtained at the prior trial was a violation of the statute reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quiring testimony in open court, i.e. 77-35-12.

The Utah court held iha: !

to vacate the sentence would be tantamolmt to inquiring into the mental
attitude and mind of the judge.
what he obviously knew.

He could not be required to disregard

In that respect, at least, the application of

77-35-13 was never passed upon by the court.
In 1969 the court again had an opportunity to decide the

applicability of 77-35-13.

Again it sidestepped the issue.

In State vs.

Cunico, 23 U. 2d. 325, 462 P. 2d. 720, Justice Tuckett, writing for the
court held that where clemency had actually been extended to the defendo:c
and he was placed on probation upon the condition that he serve one mon\r.
in the county jail, there could not lx;any violation of the statute nor abuse
of judicial discretion.
In 1973, the case of State vs. Doremus was decided, 29 U. 2d.
373, 510 P. 2d. 529 -- again on the basis that defendant had nothing to
complain about since clemency had in fact been extended to the dcfendaJH.
And finally the case of Reddish vs. Smith, no. 15455, was
decided March 1, 1978.

One of the contentions of the appellant was that

there were factual errors in the pre sentence report which came to his
attention after judgment and committment to the Utah State Pcnetentiary.

He filed a writ of habeas corpus which was summarily denied by the distr:
court.

The Supreme court denied his writ upon the ground that habeas

corpus was not an appropriate remedy where the matter could have Lill''
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I

raised on appeal.

Dicta in the case makes reference to the fact that

no discretion was allowed the sentencing judge, and therefore, sections
77-3S-12 and 13 did not come into play.

The decision, however, simply

dcciclcd that habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy.
If the statute is to mean anything, it must mean, at the very
least, that defendants be given the substance of any presentence reports.
If the plain meaning of the words is to be accorded them, it means that
presentence reports

~t

be utilized.

The writer believes that a reason-

able interpretation would allow their use where both parties are in agreement
and know the contents, otherwise they must be prohibited.

It is interesting

to note that this writer can find no authorization for a presentence report
or investigation in the statutes.

There are references to such, as in

76-3-104, but nothing expressly authorizing, limiting, or otherwise
defining the use of the traditional prcscntence report.

Section 76-3-104

expressly authorizes committment to prison for a 90 day evaluation and
report, and defines the conditions and limits thereof.

One of the conditions

is that counsel for the prosecution and for the defendant be appraised of
the results of the evaluation.

The same conditions should be required for

use of the tradi tion::il pre sentence report.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not carry out its responsibility to
ddc-rminc that there were facts sufficient to justify accepting the
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defendant's guilty plea.

For that reason he should I.Jc allowed to withdraw

the plea and enter a new plea of not guilty.

In addition, the sentence is

disproportionate to the severity of the offense, particularly so since it
constitutes a first offense for appellant.
The constitutional requirements of due process as outlined
in the Gardner vs. Florida case absolutely prohibit the use of a secret
presentence report, particularly where, as here, the defendant asks
for an opportunity to consider the allegations of the report and to present
evidence in rebuttal.

And finally, the mandate of the Utah statute prohibits

the use of any information developed by the court in the sentencing process
unless that information is presented by testimony in open court.

For all

of the foregoing, and for each of them, the case should be remanded to the
district court with instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea and enter a plea of not guilty, or, in the alternative, the sentence
should be vacated and the matter remanded with instructions to allow
inspection of the presentence report and an opportunity to present evidence
in rebuttal prior to resentencing.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBEHT L."' LOHD

Attorney for J\ppcllant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

l

